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We examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of accounting misstatements 
and on market reactions to subsequent restatements. Using a matched-firm approach, we find 
that family control overall reduces the incidence of misstatements, consistent with the notion 
that controlling families have a greater concern for reputation than nonfamily blockholders. 
However, compared to nonfamily firm restatements, restatements announced by family-
controlled firms trigger significantly more negative market reactions. We attribute the more 
negative market reactions to the greater loss in reputation and higher investor scepticism of 
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High-quality accounting information plays a central role in designing the mechanisms 
that mitigate various agency conflicts among blockholders, managers, and outside investors 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). 
Because of the prevalence of family firms across the globe, a growing number of studies 
examine the association between family ownership/control and the quality of accounting 
information (e.g., Wang, 2006; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, 
& Sansone, 2010; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2014). The evidence from existing studies is, 
however, inconclusive. Moreover, little is known about whether and how family control 
influences the way investors react to changes in accounting information quality.  
In this study we build on prior literature to examine the impact of family control on 
accounting restatements.1 Specifically, we aim to answer two related questions. Does family 
control reduce or increase the likelihood of a firm misstating its accounting statement? Do 
investors react differently to restatements announced by family-controlled firms and those by 
nonfamily-controlled firms? 2 We focus on accounting restatements not only because the 
unprecedented number of accounting restatements have caused great concern among 
regulators and other market participants, but also because restatement is one of the most 
visible forms of low-quality accounting information (Cao, Myers, & Omer, 2012) and there is 
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper, we use the term 'family firms (nonfamily firms)' or 'family-controlled firms (nonfamily-
controlled firms)' interchangeably, because our definition of family firms requires that the founding family 
exercises effective control of the firm (see Section 3.3.1 for more details). 
2 Because prior literature finds significant differences in market reactions between restatements of a material and 
immaterial nature and between restatements initiated by different parties (e.g, Palmrose, Richard, & Scholz, 
2004; Hennes et al., 2008; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011; Cao et al., 2012), in this paper we focus on mandatory 
material restatements to avoid unnecessary complexity. However, future research to further examine the 
possible different impacts of family control on these different types of restatements will be interesting. 
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no need for researchers to use a model to identify low-quality firms (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 
2010).  
The link between family control and the likelihood of accounting restatements is well 
supported by economic theory and existing literature. The multi-generation nature of 
controlling families' ownership suggests that they have greater concern for reputation than 
nonfamily blockholders (Gilson, 2007; Chen et al., 2008). This will deter family-controlled 
firms from misstating their financial statements not only because subsequent restatements 
often cause substantial reputational penalties (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Murphy, 
Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009), but also because family owners may lose certain other 
nonpecuniary benefits, such as high social status and political connections, which are 
reputation-based. In addition, restatements are often associated with a wide range of negative 
consequences (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Graham, 
Li, & Qiu, 2008; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011). Family owners' concentrated and underdiversified 
equity ownership means that they will bear a significant proportion of economic losses 
resulting from mandatory restatements, which further reduces family owners’ incentive for 
misreporting.  
In summary, controlling families' greater concern for reputation, high equity ownership, 
and their dominant positions and better monitoring of managers, indicate that they have more 
incentives, as well as the capacity, to provide high-quality accounting information, leading to 
a negative relationship between family control and the likelihood of misstatements. 
We next explore whether investor reactions to subsequent restatements differ between 
family-controlled firms and nonfamily-controlled firms. Family-controlled firms are 
characterized by potentially more severe agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder 
and minority shareholders, suggesting that investors have a greater demand for high-quality 
accounting information for family-controlled firms and consequently are more sensitive to 
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the deterioration in the quality of accounting information in family-controlled firms than in 
nonfamily-controlled firms. Restatements provide new information that leads outside 
investors not only to lower their expectation about the quality of accounting information, but 
also to increase their concerns about management's opportunistic decision making, with both 
effects likely to have more negative consequences for family firms than for nonfamily firms. 
Therefore, investors are likely to react more negatively to restatements announced by family-
controlled firms than to those by nonfamily-controlled firms.  
In addition, accounting restatements reveal that the design and / or the implementation of 
corporate governance is relatively weak, deepening investors' concerns about possible 
expropriation by controlling shareholders, which is perceived to be more severe in family-
controlled firms than in nonfamily-controlled firms. Finally, the literature finds that the media 
is more likely to publicize targets or events about which there is a higher demand for 
information or with high prominence (e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Dyck & Zingales, 
2003). This suggests that restatements announced by family-controlled firms are likely to 
attract more media attention, which further enhances the more negative market reactions to 
family firm restatement announcements. Combining the above analysis, we predict that 
investors' greater concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behaviour and the 
unfavourable media coverage are likely to trigger more negative market reactions to 
restatements announced by family-controlled firms than those announced by nonfamily-
controlled firms.  
 We test our hypotheses using a sample of 151 accounting restatements announced by 
Chinese public firms in the period 2004 to 2010. The majority of the restatement literature 
focuses on the US market. The US has one of the most widely dispersed ownership structures 
and most favourable institutional environments, which suggests that both the causes and the 
consequences of accounting restatements are likely to differ significantly between the US and 
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many other countries (Coffee, 2005). China is characterized by a weak legal environment, 
underdeveloped but fast-growing financial markets, and a highly concentrated ownership 
structure, making China a good representative of many emerging markets. Another salient 
feature and advantage of Chinese data is that the vast majority of listed firms in China have a 
dominant controlling shareholder with a high ownership stake. This allows us to implicitly 
control for ownership concentration, giving us greater confidence to conclude that our 
findings are truly attributable to the nature of family control rather than to ownership 
concentration itself. 
Using a matched-firm approach, we find that, compared to nonfamily-controlled firms, 
family-controlled firms in China are significantly less likely to misstate their annual financial 
statements, even after controlling for firm characteristics and other corporate governance 
proxies that are found to be associated with accounting misstatements in prior studies. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that controlling families have a greater concern for 
reputation as well as the overall evidence that family owners have greater incentives to 
mitigate agency costs than nonfamily blockholders (e.g., Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2014).  
With respect to investor reactions to accounting restatements, we find that family control 
is associated with significantly stronger market reactions, specifically more negative 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher abnormal 
trading volume (ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over short windows  
surrounding the restatement announcement. The stronger negative reactions to family firm 
restatements are even more pronounced when the risk of expropriation by the controlling 
shareholder is higher. We also find that family restatement firms experience a significantly 
larger loss in the information content of earnings measured by the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) compared to nonfamily restatement firms.   
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, we establish a direct link 
between family control and market reactions to accounting restatements. In this regard, our 
study complements an important body of literature that tries to identify the determinants of 
market reactions to restatements. For example, more negative stock returns are found to be 
associated with restatements that involve frauds (Palmrose et al., 2004), core accounts 
(Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005), less accounting complexity (Peterson, 
2012), and restatements that reduce earnings (Palmrose et al., 2004; Callen, Robb, & Segal, 
2008). This study generates direct evidence that the identity of controlling shareholders, in 
this case founding families, can also influence market reactions to accounting restatements. 
Specifically, our results show that investors are more sensitive to the deterioration in 
accounting information quality, as proxied by accounting restatements, in family-controlled 
firms than in nonfamily-controlled firms; consequently they react more negatively to family 
firm restatements than to nonfamily firm restatements. Existing evidence on the impact of 
family control on market reactions to restatements is scarce. 
Second, the existing literature on family firms commonly relies on the assumption that 
family firms have a greater concern for reputation than nonfamily firms because, compared to 
nonfamily blockholders, family owners usually have a longer investment horizon, a greater 
equity ownership, a larger proportion of their wealth tied to the success of the firms, and 
greater nonpecuniary benefits. However, there is little direct empirical evidence that family 
control leads to greater corporate reputation. We build on prior literature to address an 
important but largely ignored question, 'What are the implications or consequences when the 
reputation of controlling families is impaired?' The stronger and more negative reactions and 
the larger drop in ERC following accounting restatements by family firms indicate more 
severe consequences once investors' higher expectations about family firms’ concern for 
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reputation is violated. Our results thus provide indirect empirical evidence that family firms 
do have greater incentives to build and maintain a good reputation.  
To some extent, our findings are consistent with those in Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi 
(2013), who find larger negative market reaction to announcements of violations of rules and 
regulations when firms with low past violation records (i.e., good reputation) violate the rules. 
In this regard, our study also provides empirical support to the expectancy violation theory 
(Burgoon & LePoire, 1993; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). 
Third, this study enhances our understanding of the impact of family control/ownership 
on accounting information quality, especially for emerging markets. Fan and Wong (2002) 
find that concentrated ownership in East Asia is associated with less informative earnings. 
Our study in contrast suggests a negative relationship between family control and the 
likelihood of accounting misstatements (i.e., higher earnings quality). We offer two possible 
explanations for the seemingly contradictory results. First, Fan and Wong (2002) examine the 
impact of ownership concentration, while we focus on the impact of family control. As we 
argue throughout this paper, the incentives and the impact of controlling families are different 
from those of nonfamily blockholders. The unique feature of Chinese data allows us to 
attribute our findings to the nature of family control rather than to ownership concentration 
itself. Second, for firms listed in the Chinese markets where a large number of firms have 
relatively low-quality information, providing low-quality earnings  (e.g., large discretionary 
accruals or less timely loss recognition) does not necessarily impair a firm's (and ultimately 
the controlling shareholder's) reputation. In contrast, accounting misstatements and 
subsequent restatements are much more serious than other forms of low-quality information 
and therefore are more likely a reputation-impairing event. The analysis and our empirical 
evidence thus suggest that a positive association between family ownership/control and 
information opacity (or other forms of low-quality accounting information) do not necessarily 
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imply a positive association between family ownership/control and the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements. 
We note that the relationship between family firms and accounting restatements has been 
addressed by several papers, such as Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Tong (2007), both 
using US data. While Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that a firm is more likely to restate its 
earnings if the CEO belongs to the founding family, Tong (2007) finds a lower probability of 
restatements among family firms than nonfamily firms. Apart from using Chinese data 
instead of US data, our paper differs from these two papers in one important aspect. Neither 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) nor Tong (2007) distinguish between voluntary restatements and 
mandatory (or forced) restatements. As Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) point out, a lower 
rate of voluntary restatements could possibly indicate a lack of detection and disclosure of 
accounting errors and irregularities and thus a lower earnings quality. The exclusion of 
voluntary restatements from our study gives us relatively high confidence to conclude that the 
lower incidence of mandatory restatements among family firms does suggest that family 
firms have a higher reporting quality than nonfamily firms.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample. Section 4 
reports our main empirical results. Section 5 carries out some robustness tests. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Family Control and Accounting Misstatements 
Direct evidence on the relationship between family control and the incidence of 
accounting misstatement is scarce. Therefore, we briefly review the literature that elaborates 
the unique characteristics of family ownership and some empirical evidence on the 
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relationship between family firms and the quality of accounting information, from which we 
then introduce our hypotheses.  
The literature often points out family owners' greater concern for reputation as a salient 
characteristic of family firms. Gilson (2007) points out that 'because of intrafamily 
inheritance and family ties, the current generation of decision makers, at least in functional 
family businesses, treats the next generation's utility as the equivalent of their own' (p. 643). 
Therefore, family owners' desire to pass on successful family businesses to future generations 
can constitute a powerful motivation to adopt a long-term investment approach and naturally 
give them greater incentives to invest more to build and protect a reputation (Gilson, 2007; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). In addition, Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer 
(2003) point out that a family name connected to a successful family business may bring in 
nonpecuniary or reputational benefits, such as a high social status and political connections. 
The analysis thus suggests that controlling families have stronger incentives than nonfamily 
blockholders not to misstate their financial statements, because misstatements could impair or 
even damage a firm’s reputation, which is more difficult to restore for family firms than for 
nonfamily firms. 
We argue that family owners in China are likely to have an even greater concern for 
reputation than their counterparts in more developed markets. The relatively weak formal 
institutions in China, and especially the lack of an effective judicial and investor protection 
system, mean outside investors have few channels through which to take action against 
controlling shareholders when their rights are jeopardized (MacNeil, 2002; Allen, Qian, & 
Qian, 2005). As a result, contracting and financing in China often rely on alternative informal 
governance mechanisms. Reputation probably plays the most important role in informal 
enforcement, along with relationship (Allen et al., 2005; Gilson, 2007; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 
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2012). This is in stark contrast with contracting in more developed markets where it is largely 
based on rule of law. 
Controlling families' long-term oriented approach also means they are less interested in 
the day-to-day stock price movements, thus giving family-controlled firms less incentive to 
manage earnings to manipulate short-term stock prices. In addition, the (frequent) unification 
of the positions of controlling shareholder and management, or their dominant power over 
nonfamily managers, suggests that controlling families are effective 'monitors-in-place' 
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) who are both motivated and well positioned to discipline 
managerial agents. Furthermore, family members are often as knowledgeable as managers 
about their firms, enabling them to provide effective checks on professional managers. 
Consistent with this view, Chen (2005) finds that not only can family owners quickly detect 
managers’ manipulation of accounting information, they can also rely less on accounting-
based performance measures in designing management compensation. This in turn reduces 
managers' opportunistic behaviour in earnings management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Coffee, 2005).  
To provide further support to our argument, it is worth pointing out some of the salient 
characteristics that differentiate a typical nonfamily firm from a family firm in China. Unlike 
in the US and UK where most firms are widely held, the majority of non-SOEs in China have 
at least one blockholder with more than 10% of cash flow rights (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2015). In 
fact, the largest blockholder holds an average of 32.6% of all control rights, which is above 
the 30% threshold set by the CSRC in determining effective control (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013). 
Such a concentrated ownership structure gives the controlling shareholder great power in 
influencing corporate behaviour. Compared to family owners, nonfamily blockholders 
usually have a shorter investment horizon and are less concerned about reputation. As a result, 
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nonfamily firms are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders and provide less 
transparent information to conceal their expropriation (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013, 2015).  
Taken together, controlling families' greater concern for reputation and the long-term 
nature of their equity holding motivate them to provide high-quality accounting information. 
Thus, we present our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Compared to nonfamily-controlled firms, family-controlled firms are less likely to 
misstate their accounting statements. 
2.2 Family Control and Market Reactions to Accounting Restatements 
Family firms are also characterized by concentrated ownership that may possibly imply 
more severe agency problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Minority shareholders, being concerned about the potential risk of expropriation by 
controlling families, will demand high-quality accounting information. This suggests that, 
compared to minority shareholders in nonfamily-controlled firms, those in family-controlled 
firms are more sensitive to the quality and hence the deterioration in the quality of accounting 
information. In addition, a strong internal corporate governance system is important in 
helping to mitigate agency conflicts, especially when external governance (e.g., statutory 
regulation and formal institutions) is weak, such as in the Chinese market. Restatements 
provide new information that allows outside investors to learn that either the firm's internal 
governance policy is not well designed to prevent controlling shareholders' opportunistic 
behaviour, or such a governance system is not effectively implemented (Kinney & McDaniel, 
1989). Furthermore, restatements exacerbate the information asymmetry between insiders 
and minority shareholders, making it even more difficult for minority shareholders to assess 
the efficacy of a firm's internal governance. As minority shareholders are generally more 
concerned about controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour in family-controlled firms 
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than in nonfamily-controlled firms, the analysis above thus suggests more negative investor 
reactions to restatements announced by family-controlled firms. 
In addition, a number of studies find that the media (or the press) can play an important 
role in identifying and monitoring firm frauds (Miller, 2006). In choosing which firm or fraud 
to cover, reporters/publishers will maximize the benefits of articles by focusing on firms that 
have high visibility or those where there is a great demand for information (Dyck & Zingales, 
2003). The literature finds that the media is more likely to publicize targets or events 
involving firms / people who are prominent or of high reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). This suggests that, compared to nonfamily firm restatements, 
restatements by family-controlled firms, and in particular those involving high-profile 
entrepreneurs, are more attractive to readers and more likely to be picked up by the media. 
Does such a bias in media coverage affect investor reactions? Dyck and Zingales (2003) find 
that stock prices are most reactive to earnings announcements emphasized by the media, 
which implies that investors will react more strongly to family firm restatements than to 
nonfamily firm restatements, because the former are likely to attract more intense media 
coverage.  
Finally, firms found to be involved in accounting irregularities and other frauds 
commonly take action in a bid to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust. 
Replacing the CEO and/or other members of the firm's top management is one of the most 
typical actions (Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 2008; Karpoff et al., 2008). It is a common practice 
for the founder or other members from the controlling family to take key management 
positions in family firms. The literature has provided theoretical (e.g., Schulze, Lubatkin, & 
Dino, 2003) and empirical evidence (e.g., Leone & Liu, 2010) that a top manager from the 
controlling family is significantly less likely than an outside manager to be punished or even 
fired, especially when such an action will have a spillover effect on family relationships 
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outside the business. The discussion here thus suggests that, compared to nonfamily firms, 
family firms are often short of one important and effective tool to signal to investors their 
intent and commitment to improve corporate governance and to restore investor trust.  
Summing up our discussion, on the one hand, minority investors have a higher 
expectation that controlling families will be concerned about their reputation ; while, on the 
other hand, they have greater concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behavior. 
Thus, they have both a higher expectation about the supply of, and a greater demand for, 
high-quality accounting information from family-controlled firms. Once a family-controlled 
firm restates its accounting statement, minority investors' initial expectation about reputation 
is violated and their concerns about controlling families’ opportunistic behaviour become 
dominant. In other words, a restatement by a family firm will turn around investors’ attitude 
towards them. Such a perception, together with the unfavourable bias in media coverage, is 
likely to lead minority investors to react more negatively to family firm restatements. Thus, 
we state our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Accounting restatements announced by family-controlled firms lead to stronger and 
more negative market reactions than restatements announced by nonfamily-controlled firms.  
2.3 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control on market reactions 
The above analysis suggests that, after the restatement announcement, investors reassess 
their expectation and perception about the controlling families' commitments and behaviour. 
Specifically, a restatement is likely to lower the credibility of the accounting information in 
the restatement firm and increase outside investors' mistrust of the controlling 
families/managers, as well as their concerns about controlling families' opportunistic and 
expropriating behaviour. Naturally the increase in investors' concern will be more significant 
in an environment where such a risk of expropriation is perceived to be higher, for example, 
when the controlling shareholders' control-ownership wedge is higher and when corporate 
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information is more opaque (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 
2002; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Anderson et al., 2009). Consequently, the more 
negative market reactions to family firm restatements will be even more significant. Thus, we 
state our third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The impact of family control on market reactions to restatements is more pronounced 
when the risk of expropriation by the controlling family is higher.  
 
3. Research Design and Sample 
3.1 Research Design 
To test our first hypothesis H1, we estimate the following logit model: 




10     (1) 
In this model, Misstate is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm misstates its annual 
financial report in a given period; Family is a dummy variable that denotes a family-
controlled firm; and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables. All control variables in Eq. (1) are 
measured in the year when the misstatement occurs and not in the year when a subsequent 
restatement is announced. H1 predicts 𝛽𝛽1 to be negative as we expect family control will 
lower the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report.  
To test our second hypothesis H2, we estimate the following baseline regression model:  
ii
k
ii EffectsFixedControlFamilyactionReMarket εβββ ++++= ∑
2
10   (2) 
In this model, Market Reaction is the reaction generated by a firm's announcement of an 
accounting restatement and is represented by one of the following four measures: cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal trading volume (ATV), 
or abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS) over the short-term window surrounding the 
announcement. According to H2, family control leads to stronger and more negative market 
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reactions to a restatement announcement. Thus, we expect 𝛽𝛽1 to be negative when market 
reaction is measured by CAR and 𝛽𝛽1 to be positive when market reaction is represented by 
the other three measures. While it is relatively easy and straightforward to understand an 
expected positive 𝛽𝛽1 when market reaction is measured by ARV and ABAS, the reason why 
family control is positively associated with ATV is as follows. Karpoff (1987) argues that 
volume is positively related to the magnitude of price change and to the price change per se. 
Friedman (1969) further points out that a heavy volume of trading reflects differences of 
opinion among investors about the future course of prices. We argue that restatements by 
family firms result in even greater uncertainty about the credibility of the firms' post-
restatement performance, as well as the performance per se, which should be reflected in 
larger short-term stock return variances, which in turn are expected to be associated with 
larger trading volumes based on the theoretical and empirical evidence in Karpoff (1987) and 
Friedman (1969). 
In addition to the baseline regression model, we will also examine whether the 
relationship between family control and market reactions is affected by the risk of 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder (H3). To test our proposition, we estimate the 
























In this model, Ownership Wedge is the difference between the controlling shareholder's 
control (voting) rights and cash flow rights; Corporate Opacity, measured by a 
comprehensive index that consists of four components based on stock trading information 
and analyst coverage, gauges the relative information opaqueness of a firm. We predict that 
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the relationship between family control and market reactions will strengthen as the potential 
expropriation risk rises. Thus, the coefficients  𝛽𝛽2 in Eq. (3) are expected to have the same 
signs as that of 𝛽𝛽1 in Eq. (2).  
We estimate all regressions by controlling for year and industry fixed effects. Industry 
dummies are based on the two-digit classification issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
minimize the influence of outliers. In line with prior studies, we control for heteroscedasticity 
using White-adjusted standard errors.  
 
3.2 Sample Construction 
Since 1993 regulators in China have issued a series of laws and regulations in relation to 
information disclosure by publicly listed firms. However, it was not until 2004 that regulators 
explicitly set the requirement that a listed firm ‘must in a timely manner disclose restated 
financial information in the format of a significant event announcement, if there are 
accounting errors’.3 Thus, restatements of substantive significance exist only after 2004. 
There are three broad types of announcements of financial information restatements in the 
Chinese markets: appending (‘bu chong’ in Chinese pinyin), correcting (‘geng zheng’ in 
pinyin), and supplement to correcting (‘bu chong geng zheng’ in pinyin). Appending 
announcements, which account for about one half of all restatements (Lei, Wu, Wu, & Rui, 
2006), mainly concern ownership, directors, or other corporate governance-related 
nonfinancial information. Appending announcements usually have no or little impact on the 
valuation of the announcing firms and thus are excluded from this study. Correcting and 
supplement to correcting announcements, in contrast, often contain important financial 
                                                          
3 ‘Notice of further improving the quality of financial information disclosure by listed companies’, CSRC, 
January 6, 2004.  
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information that has a significant impact on firm valuation. Typically, a correcting or 
supplement to correcting announcement concerns one or more of the following items: 
misinterpreting relevant rules or regulations, recognition of revenues or expenses, asset 
transactions, investments, related party transactions, and pending litigations. 
A restatement can be either internally initiated by the firm’s management (i.e., a 
voluntary restatement) or externally initiated by either its auditor or regulators, such as the 
stock exchange or CSRC (i.e., a mandatory restatement). Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) 
argue that a lower rate of voluntary restatements could probably indicate a lower, rather than 
a higher, reporting quality. Therefore, we exclude all voluntary restatements from this study. 
Our sample selection procedures are as follows. We first manually check all 
announcements containing the keyword 'correction' ('geng zheng' in Chinese pinyin) that are 
issued by listed nonfinancial firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange websites. 
Our sample period spans the years 2004 to 2010.  Although our study focuses on 
misstatements and restatements of annual reports only4, we do not include 'annual' or 'annual 
report' in our filtering keywords because we note that a number of restatement 
announcements do not contain these two words. In other words, including 'annual' or 'annual 
report' in our search would significantly reduce our sample size.  
We first exclude 'ST' (special treatment) firms. ST firms are those firms that have made 
losses in two consecutive years and face the risk of being delisted if they continue to make 
losses for a third year, which gives them a strong incentive to misreport their financial 
statements. The trading behaviour of ST firms is also likely to be different from other non-ST 
firms. We then restrict our sample to non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) for the 
                                                          
4 Listed firms in China are not mandatorily required to have their quarterly and half-yearly financial statements 
formally audited. Thus, these two types of financial statements are not expected to have the same credibility as 
annual statements.   
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following reasons. SOEs in China often have various political and social objectives, such as 
improving employment, strengthening fiscal conditions of local governments, and 
maintaining social stability, in addition to operating performance. Therefore, compensation 
and/or promotion of managers of SOEs rely less on accounting measures when compared to 
managers of non-SOEs. Moreover, SOEs' access to bank loans is also less related to firm 
performance. Thus, compared to managers of non-SOEs, managers of SOEs have weaker 
incentives to manipulate accounting earnings. Furthermore, Firth et al. (2011) point out that 
even when false accounting has occurred, disclosure of it through accounting restatements is 
less likely for SOEs than for non-SOEs. We require that a firm is a non-SOE both in the year 
of misstatement and in the year of restatement. We identify 420 restatements announced by 
non-SOEs during our sample period. 
Following Firth et al. (2011), we next limit our sample to restatements that affect 
revenues, net earnings, or/and assets. We also exclude restatements resulting from minor or 
technical errors (e.g., nondisclosure of immaterial information, misprints, or simple 
miscalculations in the original annual reports), because Hennes et al. (2008) emphasize the 
importance of distinguishing between errors and irregularities. These criteria reduce the 
sample size to 183.5 Next, we exclude restatements that are corrections or supplementary 
restatements to previously announced restatements. This requirement further reduces our 
sample size to 177. Finally, we eliminate observations that lack the required stock trading 
data. As a result, our selection criteria yield a final sample of 151 restatements. Our sample 
construction procedure is summarized in Table 1.   
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Leone & Liu, 2010; Firth et 
al., 2011; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013), we adopt a matched-firm approach. We match each 
of our 151 restatement firms with a matching firm that satisfies all of the following criteria: 
                                                          
5 Please refer to Appendix B for examples of accounting errors and irregularities.  
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Table 1 Sample selection  
This table summarizes our sample selection process. The sample period is between 2004 and 2010. 
Each restatement firm is matched with a control firm that is based on size, IPO year, stock exchange, 
and CSRC two-digit industry code. Each control firm is required to have not announced a 
restatement within a five-year window.   
 
(1) has the same CSRC two-digit industry code as the restatement firm; (2) is a non-SOE both 
in the year of misstatement and in the year of restatement; (3) has the closest size (total assets) 
to the restatement firm; (4) does not announce any material restatements within a five-year 
window (two years before and two years after) surrounding the announcement of a 
restatement by the restatement firm; (5) has been listed for the same number of years (and on 
the same stock exchange when possible) as the restatement firm; and (6) is not an ST firm. 
The average misstatement firm is slightly smaller than the average matching firm (p = 0.093). 
We control for firm size in all multivariate regressions. 
We obtain our accounting, ownership, and other corporate governance data from the 
China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by 
Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely 
used databases for research on the Chinese stock market. Daily stock return and trading 
volume data are also from CSMAR; while data used to calculate bid-ask spreads is provided 
by Securities Industry Research Centre of Australia (SIRCA).   
 
Number of restatements of annual reports identified on the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange websites  
(requiring that a firm is a non-SOE in the year the restatement is announced) 
492 
    Less restatements where the firm is an SOE in the year of misstatement (72) 
All restatements issued by non-state-controlled firms 420 
    Less restatements that result from minor and/or technical errors (237) 
Restatements that involve corrections to revenue, earnings, or assets 183 
    Less restatements that are a correction or supplementary to previous 
restatements  
(6) 
    Less restatements that lack required stock trading data (26) 
Sample of restatements 151 
Plus matching firms 151 
Total sample of restatement and matching firms 302 
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3.3 Variable Definitions 
3.3.1 Family control  
Because of concentrated ownership in many European and East Asian countries, 
researchers commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest shareholder's ownership to 
ensure effective control (Fan & Wong, 2002; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). In this study, we use a 
dummy variable Family to denote family control if: (1) the founder and members of the 
founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm's control 
rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest 
shareholder. 
In addition to the criteria described above we also apply some other rules in determining a 
family-controlled firm, given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, if a 
firm is established by more than one family, we regard the family with the largest control 
rights as the controlling family. Second, private individuals were not allowed to own or 
control a business until some years after the start of the economic reform; until then many 
businesses were registered as village and town enterprises (VTEs), even though they were 
founded and controlled by natural persons. There firms were later re-registered as private 
enterprises when this was permitted by the new laws. In those cases these firms are regarded 
as family firms if they meet the two criteria of our family firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest 
shareholder with at least 20% control rights). In some other cases, managers of VTEs later 
become the controlling shareholders through management buyouts. We view these firms as 
nonfamily firms, even if the controlling shareholders have more than 20% of control rights. 
 
3.3.2 Market reactions 
In this paper, we test market reactions to restatement announcements with four measures, 
namely cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), abnormal return variance (ARV), abnormal 
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trading volume (ATV), and abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over the event window 
surrounding the announcement. 
We follow prior studies such as Firth et al. (2011) and Pevzner, Xie, and Xin (2015) to 
calculate CAR using the market-adjusted-model returns. We first calculate the daily abnormal 
return (AR) over the event window from the following model: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the AR of firm i on day t, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the actual stock return (dividend adjusted) of 
firm i on day t, 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  is the market return (dividend adjusted) on day t, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the 
market model estimates of firm i obtained from the estimation window [-120, -21]. We then 
sum 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 to calculate the CAR over the event window.  
We adopt the approach in DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007) and Pevzner et al. (2015) 
to calculate the ARV as follows. We obtain the stock return variance over the event window 
as the average of the squared market-adjusted return 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 . We next obtain the stock return 
variance over the estimation window [-120, -21] as the variance of the residual returns from 
each firm's market model estimated over the estimation window. The ARV is then calculated 
as the ratio of the stock return variance over the event window to the stock return variance 
over the estimation window.   
We again follow DeFond et al. (2007) and Pevzner et al. (2015) to calculate the ATV by 
dividing the average daily trading volume over the event window by the average daily trading 
volume over the estimation window [-120, -21], where trading volume is measured as the 
number of shares traded on day t scaled by the total number of tradable shares outstanding on 
day t.   
We measure the ABAS as the average bid-ask spread over the event window divided by 
the average bid-ask spread over the estimation window [-120, -21]. Following prior studies 
such as Cai (2004) and Firth et al. (2011), we use the relative bid-ask spread, i.e., absolute 
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spread divided by the average of bid and ask, in our tests. The average relative spread is then 
calculated as the mean relative spread measured in hourly intervals over the event window 
and the estimation window, respectively.  
 
3.3.3 Expropriation risk 
To test H3, we use two variables that are commonly used in the literature as proxies for 
controlling shareholders' expropriation risk. They are the divergence between controlling 
shareholder's control and cash flow rights (Ownership wedge) (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens et al., 2002) and the opacity of a firm's information disclosure (Corporate opacity) 
(e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2009).  
Following prior studies, the control-ownership wedge is calculated as the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder. A larger 
wedge indicates higher risk of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. 
To construct the corporate opacity index, we first calculate the four individual 
components of opacity, namely trading volume, log of the number of analysts following the 
firm, proportion of zero-return trading days, and daily stock return volatility. We next rank 
each of these four components into deciles, with a value of 10 representing the most opaque 
firms and a value of 1 representing the least opaque firms. We then sum these four 
components and divide it by a factor of 40, which is the maximum possible value. This 
process yields a corporate opacity index that ranges from 0.1 to 1, with higher values 
indicating greater information opacity and higher expropriation risk. 
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
We include a set of control variables in our regression models, following prior studies. 
Firm size (Firm size), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (Leverage), and whether the 
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firm records a loss in the previous year (Negative EPS) are found to be associated with the 
occurrence of accounting restatements in a large number of studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel, 
1989; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Cao et al., 2012). Starting from 2005, China has 
conducted a nontradable share (NTS) reform. After the NTS reform, those previous 
nontradable shares (often held by blockholders) become freely tradable in the stock market. 
This may have two opposite effects on the likelihood of misstatements. On the one hand, 
blockholders may become more concerned about potential negative market reactions once 
misstatements are caught. One the other hand, blockholders may have a greater incentive to 
misstate financial statements in order to manipulate stock prices. It’s unclear which 
motivation will dominate. Thus, we introduce a dummy variable Reform, which equals 1 if a 
firm has completed the NTS reform and zero otherwise.  
We also control for several corporate governance variables in our regressions. A large 
number of studies find a positive association between a firm’s earnings quality and the 
external auditor being Big N, both in the international setting (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; 
Teoh & Wong, 1993; Faber, 2005) and for the Chinese market (Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang, 
2011; Firth et al., 2011). We therefore control for external auditor identity (Big auditor) and 
whether a firm receives a modified (nonstandard) opinion on its annual report (MAO) 
(Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; Chen, Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2013). Big auditor is coded 1 if a 
firm hires one of the international Big Four auditors, or the six largest national auditors by 
revenue, to audit its financial reports.6 Board independence or the ratio of outside directors 
(Outside directors) is a commonly used variable in evaluating the strength of corporate 
governance and has been found to be associated with a lower  probability of financial 
                                                          
6 Inevitably, it is a subjective judgment as to how many auditors are deemed to be big auditors. As a robustness 
check, we alternatively classify the largest eight (Chen et al., 2011) or the largest 15 auditors (Firth et al., 2011) 
as big auditors. Our main findings are robust to these alternative definitions. 
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misreporting (Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). We also control for the 
existence of an audit committee within the firm (Audit committee), which is a dummy 
variable, and the financial expertise of the board (AF background), which is measured by the 
proportion of board members who have either an accounting or financial background, 
following a large body of literature that examines the impact of these two factors on 
earnings/financial reporting quality (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Agrawal & Chadha, 
2005; Firth et al., 2011). Finally, we control for the equity ownership by the largest 
blockholder (Top shares), following Firth et al. (2011).  
Detailed descriptions of the key variables used in this paper are listed in Appendix A. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
We report the yearly distribution of our restatement sample firms in Table 2.  
Restatements by family-controlled firms account for 36 of the total 151 restatements (or 
23.8%) in our sample. On average about 3.0% of family-controlled firms restate their 
financial reports each year (column (d)), which is significantly lower than the overall 
percentage of restatements at about 4.5% (column (b)). An alternative comparison also shows 
the lower likelihood of restatement by family-controlled firms than by nonfamily-controlled 
firms. Across the whole market, family-controlled firms account for about 35.9% of all listed 
firms during our sample period (column (e)), but restatements by family firms represent only 
about 23.8% of all restatements announced (column (f)). Even in the year 2008, when the 
ratio of family restatements to all restatements is at its highest level, only less than one third 





Table 2 Sample distribution 
This table reports the distribution of sample firms (restatement firms only) by year and by whether they are family-controlled firms.  
 
Year Number of restatements 
Ratio of restatements 
all listed firms (%) 
Number of 
family restatements 
Ratio of family 
restatements to all 
family firms (%) 
Ratio of family firms 
to all listed firms (%) 
Ratio of family 
restatements to all 
restatements (%) 
 a b c d e f 
2004 10 3.0 1 1.1 26.6 10.0 
2005 31 7.9 4 3.5 29.2 12.9 
2006 26 6.1 7 5.7 29.1 26.9 
2007 16 3.4 4 2.7 31.9 25.0 
2008 22 4.1 7 3.4 38.4 31.8 
2009 20 3.4 6 2.4 41.4 30.0 
2010 26 4.1 7 2.4 45.0 26.9 





Table 3 Univariate analyses on mean differences between misstatement firms and matching firms 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values based on one-tailed t-tests are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 Misstatement firms Matching firms Diff. in means 
 (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  
Family  0.238 0.043 0.338 0.048 -0.100*** 
(0.009) 
Firm size 20.767 0.906 20.957 1.044 -0.190* 
(0.093) 
Leverage 0.903 0.808 0.690 0.953 0.213** 
(0.012) 




0.215 0.140 0.242 0.162 -0.027*** 
(0.006) 
Negative EPS 0.264 0.442 0.113 0.318 0.151*** 
(0.000) 
Reform 0.528 0.501 0.572 0.496 -0.044 
(0.216) 
Outside directors 0.359 0.059 0.360 0.065 -0.001 
(0.941) 
Big auditor 0.205 0.406 0.265 0.443 -0.060* 
(0.088) 
MAO 0.179 0.384 0.033 0.180 0.146*** 
(0.000) 
Audit committee 0.464 0.500 0.470 0.501 -0.006 
(0.454) 
AF background 0.290 0.227 0.317 0.196 -0.027 
(0.139) 
Obs. 151 151  
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Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the characteristics of the restatement and 
matching firms. Note that all variables in Table 3 are measured in the year when the 
misstatement occurs.  
Family firms account for about 23.8% of the misstatement firms and about 33.8% of the 
matching firms. In other words, compared to matching firms, misstatement firms are less 
likely to be family firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Misstatement firms on 
average are slightly smaller than matching firms as measured by total assets. Misstatement 
firms have a substantially higher debt level than matching firms, which is consistent with 
prior studies (e.g., Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991). Firms with net 
loss in the prior year (Negative EPS) are significantly more likely to misstate their financial 
reports. This is not surprising because loss-making firms have strong incentives to manipulate 
their accounting numbers in order to conceal their true financial performance and/or to avoid 
the ST designation. Noticeably, there are no significant differences between misstatement 
firms and matching firms in several key corporate governance variables, such as board 
independence, the existence of an audit committee, and board members' accounting and 
financial expertise. These variables are found to be negatively associated with the likelihood 
of misstatements in Western countries (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005, Cao et al., 2012; 
Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013). The data thus indicates that these corporate governance 
mechanisms fail to deter Chinese firms from misstating financial reports. Consistent with 
prior studies, misstatement firms are less likely to hire a big external auditor and more likely 
to be issued with a modified auditor's opinion prior to misstatement. 
 
4.2 Family Control and Misstatements 
We test our first hypothesis H1 by estimating the regression model specified in Eq. (1) 
and report the results in Table 4.  
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Table 4 Family control and the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report 
This table presents logistic regression results on the relationship between family control and the likelihood of a firm misstating its financial report. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. P-values based on White standard errors are reported next to coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable:  Misstate  
 (1) (2) 
 coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
Family -0.744*** 0.010 -0.733** 0.018 
Firm size   -0.211 0.187 
Leverage   0.136** 0.032 
ROA   -7.434 0.516 
Top share   -1.734** 0.046 
Negative EPS   0.435** 0.014 
Reform   0.266 0.289 
Outside directors   0.790 0.724 
Big auditor   -0.259 0.148 
MAO   2.187*** 0.000 
Audit committee   -0.079 0.810 
AF background   0.515 0.422 
Constant 0.071 0.962 3.850 0.269 
Year effect Included Included 
Industry effect Included Included 
Pseudo R-squared 2.12% 7.53% 
Wald Chi2 5.48** 28.68*** 
Obs. 302 302 
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The dependent variable in both columns (1) and (2) is the likelihood of a firm misstating 
its financial report. In column (1), where the family control dummy is the only independent 
variable other than year and industry fixed effects, we find that family control has a 
significant and negative effect (coef. = -0.744, p = 0.010) on accounting misstatements. In 
column (2), we control for a set of variables including firm-specific characteristics, auditor 
attributes, and firm performance. The coefficient of Family remains negative and significant, 
although its magnitude (-0.733 vs. -0.744) and statistical significance (p = 0.018 vs. p = 0.010) 
become slightly lower.  These findings provide support for our prediction in H1 that family-
controlled firms are less likely than nonfamily-controlled firms to misstate their financial 
statements, even after controlling for other factors. 
With respect to control variables, the results are mostly consistent with the univariate 
statistics reported in Table 3. The main differences are for firm size and auditor quality. 
Neither the coefficient of Firm size nor Big auditor in Table 4 is significant, indicating that 
these two factors do not significantly affect the likelihood of accounting misstatements after 
controlling for family control and other firm-specific factors. While they are found to be 
different between misstatement firms and control firms in Table 3, these results shouldn't be 
too surprising because the difference in firm size and auditor quality between these two group 
of firms is only marginal (p = 0.093 and p = 0.088, respectively, in Table 3). 
 
4.3 Family Control and Market Reactions to Restatements 
4.3.1 Short-term reactions  
In this subsection, we test H2 in two steps. We first compare short-term market reactions 
to family firm restatements and to nonfamily firm restatements. The univariate tests are done 
over three event windows, [0, +1], [-1, +1], and [-3, +3], with day 0 being the announcement 
day.  The results are reported in Table 5.  
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Table 5 Comparison of market reactions to restatements by family firms and by nonfamily firms 
This table presents univariate tests of the different market reactions to restatements announced by family firms and by nonfamily firms, for short windows 
surrounding announcements (column (6)). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. ARV is the abnormal return variance. ATV is the abnormal trading 
volume. ABAS is the abnormal bid-ask spread. This table also tests whether the market reactions are different from zero for restatements by family firms 
and nonfamily firms, respectively. P-values in columns (3) and (5) are based on H0=0 (CAR) and H0=1 (ARV, ATV, and ABAS). Significances are based on p-












Diff. in means p-value 
(H0: Diff = 0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) = (2) – (4) (7) 
CAR [0, +1] (%) -1.481 -2.603 0.001 -1.130 0.016 -1.473** 0.044 
CAR [-1, +1] (%) -2.122 -3.601 0.001 -1.660 0.004 -1.941** 0.034 
CAR [-3, +3] (%) -2.665 -4.575 0.006 -2.067 0.003 -2.508* 0.056 
  ARV [0, +1] 2.661 2.700 0.000 2.221 0.000 0.479** 0.024 
ARV [-1, +1] 1.499 1.791 0.000 1.408 0.000 0.383** 0.039 
ARV [-3, +3] 1.538 1.898 0.000 1.437 0.008 0.461** 0.030 
 ATV [0, +1] 1.462 1.949 0.000 1.310 0.000 0.639** 0.012 
ATV [-1, +1] 1.401 1.924 0.000 1.238 0.000 0.686*** 0.005 
ATV [-3, +3] 1.432 2.019 0.000 1.248 0.000 0.771*** 0.005 
ABAS [0, +1] 2.508 2.793 0.000 1.588 0.002 1.205** 0.045 
ABAS [-1, +1] 2.323 2.633 0.000 1.324 0.007 1.309** 0.021 
ABAS [-3, +3]  2.127 2.395 0.000 1.262 0.009 1.133*** 0.008 
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We then use market reactions during the window [-1, +1] as our dependent variables to 
estimate our baseline regression model, as specified in Eq. (2), and report the regression 
results in Table 6. In unreported tests, we use market reactions over windows [0, +1] and [-3, 
+3] as dependent variables and find that our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Short-term market reactions, measured by CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, to all 
restatements, family firm restatements, and nonfamily restatements are reported in column 
(1), column (2), and column (4), respectively. Consistent with our expectation, CARs are 
negative while ARVs, ATVs, and ABASs are all positive for both family firm restatements 
and nonfamily firm restatements. All the p-values in column (3) and column (5) are 
significant at the 1% level, with only one exception (CAR [0, +1] for nonfamily firm 
restatements) which is significant at the 5% level. These statistics show that accounting 
restatements are associated with significantly negative short-term abnormal stock returns and 
increased investor uncertainty about the firms' future performance. 
Our focus is the differences in market reactions to family firm restatements and 
nonfamily firm restatements, as reported in column (6). As we can see, compared to 
restatements announced by nonfamily firms, restatements announced by family firms are 
associated with more negative short-term abnormal stock returns. For example, over the 
three-day window, CAR [-1, +1] is -3.601% for family firm restatements but only -1.660% 
for nonfamily firm restatements. The difference is significant at the 5% level (p = 0.034). The 
differences for the other three measures are all significant as well. For example, ARV [-1, +1] 
for family firm restatements is 1.791, which is significantly larger than ARV [-1, +1] for 
nonfamily firm restatements (p = 0.039). 
In summary, the data in Table 5 shows that, although both family firm restatements and 
nonfamily firm restatements result in negative short-term abnormal stock returns and increase 
uncertainty among investors about the restatement firms' future performance, the 
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consequences are significantly more severe for family firm restatements. The statistics in 
Table 5 are consistent with our prediction in H2.     
We further test H2 with multivariate regressions and report the results in Table 6.  
Our purpose here is to test any differences in market reactions between family firm 
restatements and nonfamily firm restatements, and thus the sample in Table 6 contains all 
restatement firms but no matching firms. We run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV, 
ATV, and ABAS, as the dependent variable, respectively. For each of the four market 
reaction measures we estimate two regression models: one uses the family control dummy as 
the only independent variable, apart from year and industry fixed effects, and the other model 
also includes a set of control variables.  
As can be seen from Table 6, the coefficient of Family is significant in all eight model 
specifications. The sign of the coefficient is consistent with the statistics reported in column 
(6) of Table 5. Specifically, the coefficient of Family is negative when CAR is the dependent 
variable and is positive when ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the dependent variable. The magnitude 
of the coefficient of Family becomes even larger when control variables are included in the 
regression, e.g., -2.181 in column (2) compared to -1.777 in column (1).  
Taken together, the findings in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that when a firm announces 
an accounting restatement, being family-controlled is associated with significantly more 
negative short-term stock returns (CAR), higher abnormal return variance (ARV), higher 
abnormal trading volume (ATV), and larger abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS). These 
findings suggest that investors are more concerned about the deterioration in accounting 
earnings quality in family firms and consequently react more strongly to restatements 
announced by family firms than those by nonfamily firms. The findings thus support our 




Table 6 Family control and market reactions surrounding restatement announcements 
This table presents regression results on the relationship between family control and short-window market reactions surrounding restatement 
announcements. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Dependent variables: Cumulative abnormal return 
CAR [-1,+1] 
Abnormal return variance 
ARV [-1, +1] 
Abnormal trading volume 
ATV [-1, +1] 
Abnormal bid-ask spread 
ABAS [-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































































Year effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Adj. R-squared 3.14% 7.93% 5.52% 6.41% 12.84% 14.46% 2.90% 15.19% 
F-statistic 4.69** 2.74** 7.66*** 2.66** 12.78*** 2.65** 2.11** 1.75** 
34 
 
4.3.2 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control 
In this subsection we perform additional tests to examine whether controlling for the risk 
of expropriation by shareholders perceived by investors has any effect on the relationship 
between family control and short-term market reactions (i.e., H3). The tests are based on 
regression models specified in Eq. (3). More specifically, we add to our baseline regression 
models specified in Eq. (2) a stand-alone variable as a proxy for expropriation risk and its 
interaction with family control. The regression results are reported in Table 7.  
As in Table 6, we run four sets of regressions using CAR, ARV, ATV, and ABAS, as the 
dependent variable, respectively. And for each dependent variable we estimate two regression 
models: one uses the ultimate largest shareholder's control-ownership wedge as the proxy for 
expropriation risk and the other uses corporate opacity as the proxy. 
In each of the eight models, the coefficient of Family remains significant and keeps the 
sign of its corresponding coefficient in Table 6. The results indicate that even for firms with 
low wedge and low opacity (i.e., firms with relatively low expropriation risk), family control 
still triggers stronger reactions from investors. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable 
Ownership wedge is significant across all four models and has the same sign as that of Family. 
This indicates that control-ownership wedge, like family control, also increases investor 
concern about agency problems and uncertainty. The coefficient of the stand-alone variable 
Corporate opacity, although having the same sign as that of Ownership wedge, is not 
significant across all four models. The results suggest that when market reaction is measured 
by CAR or ATV, the level of corporate opacity has no significant effect on how investors 
react to restatements announced by nonfamily firms. Our main interest is the interaction 
terms Family*Ownership wedge and Family*Corporate opacity, which capture the 




Table 7 Expropriation risk and the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements 
This table presents regression results of how the impact of family control on short-window market reactions surrounding restatement announcements is 
affected by the potential risk of expropriation by controlling families.  The potential expropriation risk is measured by control-ownership wedge and 
corporate opacity. All variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variables: Cumulative abnormal return 
CAR [-1, +1] 
Abnormal return variance 
ARV [-1, +1] 
Abnormal trading volume 
ATV [-1, +1] 
Abnormal bid-ask spread 
ABAS [-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








































































































































































Year effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Adj. R-squared 6.40% 8.58% 4.04% 7.03% 10.77% 14.60% 5.41% 14.53% 
F-statistic 2.03** 2.77** 1.93** 2.38** 2.02** 2.42** 1.94** 2.92*** 
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The coefficient of either Family*Ownership wedge or Family*Corporate opacity is 
statistically significant in all eight model specifications. The coefficients of the interaction 
terms have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients of the stand-alone Family, i.e., 
negative when CAR is the dependent variable and positive when ARV, ATV, or ABAS is the 
dependent variable. These results indicate that the stronger market reactions to family firm 
restatements become even more pronounced as the expropriation risk increases.  
Overall, the findings in Table 7 indicate that as the risk of expropriation by controlling 
shareholders increases, investors have even greater concerns about controlling shareholder's 
credibility, agency problems, and uncertainty following restatements. This will further 
strengthen the impact of family control on market reactions to restatement announcements. 
These findings are consistent with our prediction in H3. 
 
4.4 Additional Tests 
4.4.1 The timeline 
To investigate the effect of restatement over the longer term, we perform two sets of tests 
in this subsection. We first follow up our tests in Section 4.3 to compare the difference in 
market reactions (i.e., return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread) before the 
restatement announcement (window [-120, -21]) and after announcement (window [+21, 
+120]), for family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, respectively. See 
Figure 1A for the timeline. We then follow the large body of literature to examine the drop in 
the information content of earnings (measured by ERC) after the restatement announcement, 
by comparing the ERC in one year before and one year after the restatement announcements. 
Because we only have annual earnings data, we focus on yearly ERC rather than quarterly 
ERC, as in some prior studies such as Wilson (2008) and Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2014). See 
Figure 1B for the timeline. 
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Figure 1 Illustration of timeline 
Figure 1A: Timeline of market reaction tests 
                  Pre-restatement estimation window              Event window             Post-restatement estimation window 
     
                                                            
Day        -120                                                        -21               -1      0     +1               +21                                                         +120 
 
 
Figure 1B: Timeline of earnings informativeness tests 
 
                         Pre-restatement window                                                                                   Post-restatement window 
              
 
 





4.4.2 Longer-term market reactions 
In subsection 4.3.1, we examine the differences in market reactions to family firm 
restatements and nonfamily firm restatements over three short-term windows, [0, +1], [-1, 
+1], and [-3, +3]. In this subsection, we test whether the stronger market reactions to family 
firm restatements are still observed over a longer period. The literature provides mixed 
empirical evidence on whether the effects of restatements (e.g., the drop in ERC) are short-
lived (e.g., Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014). Although it is not our intention to find out 
exactly how long the effects of restatements last, the tests we perform in this subsection may 
provide complementary evidence to enhance our understanding of the issue. 
We first adopt a difference-in-difference approach. We compare the pre- and post-
restatement stock return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread for restatement firms 
and matching firms (i.e., nonrestatement firms), respectively. We then compare the changes 
(from pre- to post-restatement period) in these three measures between restatement firms and 
matching firms. Because we identify each matching firm based on industry, size, IPO year, 
and stock exchange, such a comparison also controls for the influence of these factors. The 
results are reported in Panel A of Table 8. The left-hand side of Panel A presents the results 
for 36 family restatement firms and 36 matching firms. The right-hand side presents the 
results for 115 nonfamily restatement firms and their corresponding matching firms. The pre- 
and post-restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and [+21, +120], respectively, where 
day 0 is the restatement announcement day.  
We take daily stock return variance as an example. For family restatement firms, the 
average return variance increases significantly from 3.311 in the pre-restatement estimation 
window to 3.628 in the post-restatement window (diff. = 0.317, p = 0.008). During the same 
period, although the matching firms also experience an increase in return variance, their 
increase is insignificant (diff. = 0.129, p = 0.182). The difference in the change in return
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Table 8 Longer-term effects of restatement announcements 
Panel A: Difference-in-difference tests 
Panel A of this table present the difference-in-difference test results of longer term effects of restatement announcements on market reactions, i.e., daily 
stock return volatility, daily trading volume, and bid-ask spread. The left-hand side of the table reports the statistics of the family restatement firms (36 
firms) and their matching firms. The right-hand side of the table reports the nonfamily restatement firms (115 firms) and their corresponding matching 
firms. The pre-restatement estimation window is [-120, -21] and the post-restatement estimation window is [+21, +120], with day 0 being the restatement 
announcement day. Stock return variance is the variance of the residual returns from each firm's market model; trading volume is the number of shares 
traded on the day divided by the number of tradable shares outstanding on that day; bid-ask spread is the average relative spread (i.e., absolute spread 
divided by the average of bid and ask) over the test period measured in hourly intervals.  Significances are based on p-values using the one-tailed t-test.  
 
  Family restatement firms  Nonfamily restatement firms 














Restatement firms (1) 3.311 3.628 0.317*** (0.008) 
 3.201 3.306 0.105* (0.078) 
Control firms (2) 2.977 3.106 0.129 (0.182) 
 3.003 3.087 0.084 (0.282) 
 (1) – (2) 0.334 0.522 0.188** (0.048) 
 0.198 0.219 0.021 (0.455) 
        
Trading 
volume 
Restatement firms (1) 2.382 3.196 0.814** (0.030) 
 2.960 3.052 0.092 (0.340) 
Control firms (2) 2.344 2.678 0.334 (0.122) 
 2.768 2.896 0.128 (0.288) 
(1)– (2) 0.038 0.518 0.480* (0.054) 
 0.192 0.156 0.036 (0.411) 
        
Bid-ask  
spread 
Restatement firms (1) 0.236 0.337 0.101** (0.033) 
 0.217 0.241 0.024 (0.209) 
Control firms (2) 0.209 0.258 0.049* (0.098) 
 0.222 0.230 0.008 (0.433) 
(1) – (2) 0.027 0.079 0.052* (0.064) 
 -0.005 0.011 0.016 (0.218) 
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variance (or difference-in-difference, marked in bold font in Panel A) between family 
restatement firms and their matching firms is statistically significant (diff. = 0.188, p = 0.048). 
In contrast, although nonfamily restatement firms also experience a significant increase in 
return variance from 3.201 to 3.306 (diff. = 0.105, p = 0.078), the difference-in-difference is 
insignificant (p = 0.455) between nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms.  
These difference-in-difference analyses indicate that while family restatement firms 
experience a significant increase in stock return variance over a longer window (up to 120 
days after the restatement announcement in our tests) compared to their nonrestatement 
matching firms, there is no significant difference in the change in return variance between 
nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms. The results are similar if we look at the 
changes in trading volume and bid-ask spread.  
We next perform tests to directly compare the changes in return variance, trading volume, 
and bid-ask spread between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, in 
addition to comparing the changes between each group of restatement firms and their 
corresponding nonrestatement matching firms. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 8. 
We again take stock return variance as an example to illustrate the findings. For both 
family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms, their return variance in the post-
restatement period is significantly larger than that in the pre-restatement period (p = 0.008 for 
family firms and p = 0.078 for nonfamily firms). When we look at the difference in the 
change, we can see that the increase in return variance is significantly larger for family firms 
than for nonfamily firms (diff. = 0.212, p = 0.030). In other words, the impact of the 
restatement announcement on return variance increase is more pronounced for family 
restatement firms than for nonfamily restatement firms. Comparisons in trading volume and 




Table 8 Longer-term effects of restatement announcements 
Panel B: Direct comparison between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms 
Panel B presents the statistics using an alternative approach to compare the difference in change in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread 
between family restatement firms and nonfamily restatement firms. We then compare the changes in these measures between family restatement firms 
and nonfamily restatement firms, following restatement announcements. 
 






Stock return variance 
Family firms (1) 3.311 3.628 0.317*** (0.008) 
Nonfamily firms (2) 3.201 3.306 0.105* (0.078) 
 (1) –(2) 0.110 0.322 0.212** (0.030) 
     
Trading volume 
Family firms (1) 2.382 3.196 0.814** (0.030) 
Nonfamily firms (2) 2.960 3.052 0.092 (0.340) 
 (1) –(2) -0.578 0.144 0.722* (0.057) 
     
Bid-ask spread 
Family firms (1) 0.236 0.337 0.101** (0.033) 
Nonfamily firms (2) 0.217 0.241 0.024 (0.209) 




Overall, the findings in Table 8 indicate that while both family restatement firms and 
nonfamily restatement firms experience an increase in return variance, trading volume, and 
bid-ask spread following the restatement announcement, the impact is substantially more 
significant for family restatement firms. In fact, there is no significant difference in these 
three measures between nonfamily restatement firms and their matching firms up to 120 days 
after the restatement announcement. But for family restatement firms, the increases are still 
observed.  
 
4.4.3 Information content of earnings (ERC) 
The earnings response coefficient (ERC) is the most commonly used empirical measure 
of information content of earnings and a popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 
2010). A large number of studies document a significant drop in the ERC after restatement 
announcements (e.g., Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002; Wilson, 2008; Chen et al., 2014). 
According to Chen et al. (2014), the key argument underlying the drop in the ERC is that the 
credibility of financial reporting is lower after the restatement.  This argument suggests that 
the drop in the ERC is expected to be more severe for family restatement firms than for 
nonfamily restatement firms, because we argue throughout this paper that family restatement 
firms are subject to greater credibility concerns.  
To test our prediction, we follow prior studies (e.g., Fan & Wang, 2002; Chen et al., 2014) 

















In this model, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns at year t, 
calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April (April 30 is the deadline for listed 
firms in China to release their annual reports). 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is the net earnings of year t divided by the 
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market value of equity at the beginning of year t. Post is a dummy variable that indicates the 
post-restatement financial year. Our focus is on the coefficient 𝛽𝛽4.We expect that because 
investors are more concerned about restatements by family firms, post-restatement earnings 
of family firms will be even less informative than those of nonfamily firms. Therefore, 𝛽𝛽4 is 
expected to be negative and significant. We report the regression results in Table 9. 
The tests in Table 9 include only restatement firms. The positive and significant 
coefficient of NI across all columns indicates that stock prices do respond to earnings in the 
Chinese stock markets. The insignificant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family (coef. 
= 0.001, p = 0.999) in column (1) indicates that, prior to restatements, there is no difference 
in the ERC between family and nonfamily firms, despite the fact that family firms are less 
likely to misstate their financial reports (i.e., family firms have a higher quality of earnings) 
as reported in Table 4.  
However, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term NI*Family in 
column (2) (coef. = -8.046, p = 0.000) indicates that after the restatement announcement, 
family restatement firms have a significantly lower ERC than nonfamily restatement firms. 
The results in column (3) confirm the finding in column (2). Although the negative 
coefficient of NI*Post (coef. = -2.847, p = 0.000) indicates that nonfamily restatement firms 
also experience a significant drop in the ERC after restatement announcements, the drop is 
substantially more severe for family restatement firms, as demonstrated by the interaction 
term NI*Post*Family (coef. = -4.304, p = 0.047).  
Overall, the findings in Table 9 confirm our prediction that the drop in the ERC after 
restatement announcements is more significant for family restatement firms than for 
nonfamily restatement firms, because family restatement firms are subject to greater 
credibility concerns than nonfamily restatement firms. The findings in Table 9 also provide 
additional support for our predictions in H2 and H3.  
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Table 9 Family control and the effect of restatement on the information content of earnings 
This table presents regression results of the effect of family control on the impact of restatement on the information content of earnings. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns, calculated from monthly stock returns from May to April. Pre-restatement (columns (1)) 
refers to pre-restatement financial year (Year t-1) and post-restatement (columns (2)) refers to post-restatement financial year (Year t+1), where Year t 
refers to the year in which the restatement announcement falls. Post is a dummy variable indicating post-restatement financial year (t+1). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix. P-values based on White standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns (Return) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pre-restatement Post-restatement Full sample period 
 coefficient p value coefficient p value coefficient p value 
NI 32.149*** 0.008 40.580*** 0.003 31.472*** 0.000 
NI*Family 0.001 0.999 -8.046*** 0.000 0.068 0.604 
NI*Post     -2.847*** 0.000 
NI*Post*Family     -4.304** 0.047 
NI*Firm size 1.648*** 0.004 1.857*** 0.003 1.373*** 0.004 
NI*Tobin Q -0.996*** 0.001 -0.277 0.153 -0.353** 0.026 
NI*Leverage 0.650*** 0.001 -0.018 0.976 0.428 0.277 
constant -0.086 0.684 0.619** 0.038 0.334 0.108 
Year effect Included  Included  Included  
Industry effect Included  Included  Included  
Obs. 151  151  151  
Adj. R-squared 5.03%  51.24%  23.41%  




5. Robustness Tests 
5.1 Family Firms’ Greater Concern for Reputation or Alternative Explanations? 
So far in this paper, we attribute the lower rate of misstatements in family firms to the 
nature of family ownership, i.e., family owners’ longer investment horizon and greater 
concern for reputation. However, it is also possible that there exist other systemic differences 
between family and nonfamily firms that explain the different rates of misstatements in these 
two groups of firms. We carry out additional tests in this section to test this possibility. 
Prior studies find that a firm is less likely to misstate its financial report if it has a higher 
percentage of outside directors and directors with accounting or financial expertise, if the 
positons of CEO and the chair of the board are held by different persons, if there exists an 
audit committee, and the firm’s external auditor is one of the Big N. In addition, the greater 
the number of financial analysts following the firm and the higher the frequency of board 
meetings, the more likely it is that accounting misstatements will be discovered and thus the 
lower the incentive for the management to engage in misreporting (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1996; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2011; Firth et al., 2011; 
Cao et al., 2012; Kryzanowski & Zhang, 2013).  
Building on the evidence in these studies, we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test 
whether there are significant differences in the abovementioned characteristics between 
family and nonfamily firms for the whole sample that includes both restatement firms and 
matched firms. Second, we repeat the tests for the restatement firms only. The test results are 
reported in Table 10. 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 10 represent the results for the whole sample. As we can see, 
there is no significant difference between family and nonfamily firms in the percentage of 
outside directors, the number of board meetings, the percentage of firms with an audit 
committee, the percentage of directors with accounting or financial background, and the
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Table 10 Tests for possible alternative explanations for the lower likelihood of misstatements in family firms 
This table presents the results of tests that compare several corporate governance characteristics between family and nonfamily firms. Columns (1) to (3) 
include the full sample that consists of both restatement firms and matched firms. Columns (4) to (6) include only restatement firms. Significances are 
based on p-values using the one-tailed t-test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample (restatement firms & matched firms) Restatement firms only 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5) 
 Family Nonfamily Diff. Family Nonfamily Diff. 
Outside directors 0.362 0.358 0.004 0.360 0.359 0.001 
Number of board meetings 8.828 9.177 -0.349 9.000 9.339 -0.339 
Audit committee 0.494 0.456 0.038 0.472 0.461 0.011 
AF background 0.288 0.310 -0.022 0.324 0.314 0.010 
CEO and Chair the same person 0.184 0.153 0.031 0.139 0.183 -0.044 
Big auditor 0.299 0.209 0.090* 0.222 0.200 0.022 
Number of financial analysts 3.656 5.443 -1.787** 2.361 4.983 -2.621*** 
Obs. 87 215  36 115  
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percentage of firms where the CEO and the chair are the same person. Compared to 
nonfamily firms, family firms are slightly more likely to hire a Big N auditor. Although a Big 
N auditor can help reduce the likelihood of an accounting misstatement, it can also indicate 
that family firms have greater incentive to provide higher quality financial information and 
therefore are more willing to hire a Big N auditor to help them achieve this.  
We also note that compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are followed by fewer 
financial analysts. According to the literature, this would suggest that family firms are more 
likely, rather than less likely, as we find in this paper, to misstate their financial reports than 
nonfamily firms. Thus the results strongly support our argument that it is family owners’ 
greater concern for reputation that deters them from misreporting. 
Columns (4) to (6) represent the test results for the restatement firms only. The results 
again show that family restatement firms are followed by fewer financial analysts than 
nonfamily restatement firms. There are no significant differences between family restatement 
firms and nonfamily restatement firms in all other firm characteristics.  
Overall, the results in Table 10 provide strong support for our argument that the lower 
rate of misstatements in family firms is attributable to family owners’ greater concern for 
reputation, not systemic differences in other corporate governance characteristics. 
 
5.2 Alternative Definitions of Family Firms 
In this paper, a firm is defined as a family firm if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the 
founder and members of the founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at 
least 20% of the firm's control rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members 
combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder. The literature has used different definitions of 
family firms. In this section, we discuss several alternative definitions.  
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First, studies using US data typically place no minimum, or a very low threshold, such as 
5%, for family ownership in defining family firms (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Anderson et al., 2009). However, because the majority of non-SEOs in China have a 
controlling shareholder (Ma et al., 2013) this approach may be inappropriate (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Nonetheless, if we relax our definition of family firm by 
removing the 20% threshold for control rights, the number of family firms increases slightly 
from 36 to 37 in the restatement sample and from 87 to 90 in the whole sample. As the 
increases are minimal, we do not expect significant changes to our main findings. Robustness 
tests using the new samples confirm our expectation. 
Second, some other studies only require one or more family members to serve as CEO, 
chair, or directors, with or without a significant equity ownership, for a firm to be defined as 
a family firm (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, & 
Wiwattanakantang, 2013).We argue that this definition may not be appropriate for the 
Chinese markets for two reasons. First, in countries such as US, founding families can use 
dual-class shares to control a substantial proportion of voting rights with a relatively small 
ownership. For example, the Ford family own only about 5% of the cash flow rights of Ford 
Motors; yet they control 40% of the voting rights. However, dual-class shares are not 
permitted in China. Second, many family firms in Western countries are run by or with active 
involvement of the third, fourth, or even later generations of the founding family (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). The multi-generational involvement allows the founding family to insert 
significant influence on firm behaviour with even minimal ownership. In contrast, private 
ownership of a firm in China has been permitted only in the last three decades or so. As a 
result, the founding family can barely influence firm behaviour without a controlling 
ownership. For these two reasons, we believe that it is appropriate to require a 20% threshold 




6. Conclusion and Implications 
Family-controlled firms are associated with some of the most high-profile accounting 
scandals across the world (e.g., Adelphia in the US, Parmalat in Italy, and Yin Guang Xia in 
China). This naturally raises two questions. Are family-controlled firms indeed more likely to 
have low-quality accounting information than nonfamily-controlled firms? Does family 
control affect investor reactions to the revelation of low quality or the deterioration of 
accounting information quality? These questions are important because of increasing 
concerns among regulators and other market participants about the widespread and increasing 
incidence of accounting irregularities, as well as the fact that family-controlled firms 
represent one of the most prevalent forms of organization across the globe. Although the first 
question has attracted increasing academic interest, the second question has so far been 
largely ignored by researchers.  
In this paper, we examine the impact of family control on the likelihood of a firm 
misstating its financial report and on investor reactions to accounting restatements, with a 
focus on the latter. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are significantly 
less likely to misstate their financial reports, consistent with the notion that controlling 
families have greater reputation concerns than nonfamily blockholders, which gives family 
owners a greater incentive to deliver high-quality accounting information.  
We also find that following accounting restatements family-controlled firms trigger 
substantially stronger investor reactions, measured by more negative cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR), larger abnormal return variance (ARV), larger abnormal trading volume 
(ATV), and higher abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS), over a short window surrounding the 
restatement announcements. Further tests show that the stronger investor reactions to family 
firm restatements are more pronounced when the risk of expropriation by controlling 
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shareholders is higher. These findings indicate that following restatement announcements 
investors quickly readjust their views about controlling families' concern for reputation and 
the risk of expropriation. Specifically, restatements lower investors' perception of the 
credibility of accounting information and ultimately the credibility of controlling families. In 
fact, the significant increases in return variance, trading volume, and bid-ask spread in family 
restatement firms are still observable 120 days after the restatement announcements; but these 
effects of restatements disappear for nonfamily restatement firms during the same period. 
Moreover, an examination of the ERC indicates that, after restatement announcements, 
investors perceive accounting earnings of family firms to be less informative than those of 
nonfamily firms. 
Our findings have two important implications. At the firm level, this study suggests that 
family-controlled firms should promote a high quality of financial reporting practice with 
greater efforts than nonfamily-controlled firms, in order to avoid the severe penalties imposed 
by the market. At the policy level, to maximize the benefits of accounting information in 
reducing market frictions and in facilitating the development of a resilient stock market, 
regulators should take measures to encourage the adoption of credible reporting by all listed 
firms, as well as enhancing the market perception of the trustworthiness of corporate insiders 







Appendix A: Descriptions of key variables  
 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
Misstate Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm misstates its annual financial report in a given period (and therefore has to restate the 
financial report in a later period); zero for control firms 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) Equals the sum of the daily abnormal returns over the event window, where daily abnormal returns are calculated using the 
market-adjusted model. 
Abnormal return variance (ARV) Equals the average of the squared market-model-adjusted daily return over the event window scaled by the stock return variance 
over the estimate window [-120, -21].  
Abnormal trading volume (ATV) Equals the average of the daily trading volume over the event window scaled by the average daily trading volume over the 
estimate window [-120, -21]. 
Abnormal bid-ask spread (ABAS) Equals the average of the hourly relative spread (i.e., absolute spread divided by the average of bid and ask) over the event 
window scaled by the average of the hourly relative spread over the estimate window [-120, -21]. 
Key independent variables  
Family  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate largest shareholder in a firm is a family (all family member ownership combined); 
zero otherwise 
Post  Dummy variable indicating post-restatement period 
Ownership wedge The difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate largest shareholder 
Corporate opacity An index that ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading days, and stock return volatility in 
deciles and divides the sum of the four components by 40, resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 1. A higher value of opacity 
index indicates that a firm’s information is more opaque. 
Firm characteristics  
Firm size Natural log of total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities / total assets 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Top share The proportion of equity ownership by the largest shareholder 
Outside directors Number of independent directors / total number of directors 
Big auditor Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s annual report is audited by one of the largest 10 auditing firms in China; zero otherwise 
MAO Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified (qualified) audit opinion on its annual report; zero otherwise 
Negative EPS Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a negative EPS (earnings per share); zero otherwise 
Reform Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has completed the nontradable share reform; zero otherwise 
Audit committee Dummy variable that equals 1 if there exists an audit committee within the firm 
AF Background The ratio of board members who have either accounting or financial background 
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Appendix B Examples of accounting errors and irregularities 
This list is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all types of accounting errors and irregularities that have occurred in China. Rather, the examples listed here 
indicate how we classify various accounting restatements into accounting errors and irregularities. 
Panel A: Examples of accounting errors 
 
  
Stock code Announcement date 
(YYYY/MM/DD) 
Reasons for restatement / before restatement Actions taken / after restatement 
000062 2010/04/09 A joint-partner company was mistakenly shown in the annual report as 
a subsidiary 
The restatement corrected this mistake 
000150 2009/04/30 This company would purchase Mr. Wang’s 4% ownership in this 
company for a price of ‘7,200,574.25 wan yuan’ 
…for a price of ‘7,200,574.25 yuan’ 
000662 2009/04/11 The number of shareholders was 22,917 The number was changed to 31,891 
000683 2009/04/10 Discrepancies between figures in Cash Flow Statement and those in 
Notes to the Statement. The figures in the Statement were incorrect 
Cash inflows in relation to operations was changed from 
1,121,868,936 yuan to 721,868,936 yuan; Cash outflows 
in relation to operations was changed from 888,410,372 
yuan  to 488,410,372 yuan 
000939 2009/05/16 1) owners’ equity was shown in the annual report as 36884 wan yuan; 
2) the figures in page 58 of the annual report were in the unit of yuan; 
3) an nonexistent related party transaction was mistakenly shown in 
the report 
1) Owners’ equity was changed to  36848 wan yuan; 2) 
those figures were changed to in the unit of wan yuan; 3) 
this transaction was removed 
002081 2008/03/31 In the list of top 10 unrestricted largest shareholders, the names of the 
number 9 and 10 shareholders were incorrect 
The restatement corrected this mistake  
002139 2008/03/29 In Note 11 to the financial report, next to the compensation of three 
directors, there was a remark which said “independent direct 
allowance” 
The restatement removed this remark. 
600331 2006/03/22 Due to miscalculation, the increase in fixed assets was reported as 
752,018,731 yuan and accumulated depreciation was reported as 
96,518,807 yuan 
The restatement changed these two figures to 
756,677,479 yuan and 96,883,862 yuan, respectively. 
600366 2007/05/15 The term of an independent director, Mr. Qian Weishen, expired on 
2009/04/27 
…expired on 2007/04/25 
600481 2006/04/11 1) Total compensation of directors, supervisors, and senior executives 
was 186 wan yuan; 2) total amount of related party transections with 
controlling shareholders and subsidiaries was 382 yuan 
After correction, total compensation was 206 wan yuan; 
total related party transactions were 382 wan yuan 
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Stock code Announcement date 
(YYYY/MM/DD) 
Reasons for restatement / before restatement Actions taken / after restatement 
000078 2009/04/27 An sale of assets was not completed but income had been 
recorded in the financial report 
Net profit and equity were reduced by 18,650,860 yuan 
000509 2006/03/18 1) Incomes in previous years were artificially inflated; 2) bad 
debt reserves were underestimated 
Retained earnings was reduced by 54,900,261 yuan 
000558 2006/02/16 Tax payable and tax expense in one subsidiary was 
underestimated  
Profit and retained earnings were reduced by 1,145,010 yuan 
000760 2007/03/22 Some expenses were not reported Retained earnings in 2005 was reduced by 4,225,726 yuan 
000998 2009/06/29 Gain from the sale of part equity was recorded as the profit 
in 2008. However, the regulator required it not be 
recognised as profit 
Total assets in 2008 was reduced by 24,924,930 yuan; net profit was 
reduced by 24,844,394 yuan; EPS was reduced by 0.083 yuan 
600311 2006/04/26 1) Some Short-term bank loans were not reported; 2) 
associated financial expenses were not recognised 
1) Short-term loans were increased by 70,000,000 yuan; 2) financial 
expenses were increased by 3,596,647 yuan; 3)net profit was 
reduced by 12,004,613 yuan 
600711 2004/02/14 1) Incorrectly treated long-term equity investment; 2) did not 
disclose loan guarantee provided for its whole owned 
subsidiaries  
1) Long-term equity investment was reduced by 2,309,763 yuan; 2) 
disclosed that the listed company had provided loan guarantee of 
48,5000,000 yuan 
600840 2005/03/12 Accrual of tax payable was underestimated Retained earnings was reduced by 3,275,563 yuan 
600873 2009/10/27 An ongoing litigation, which if won could potentially have 
positive impact on earnings, is unlikely to have the expected 
outcome because the defendant had gone missing 
Retained earnings and owners’ equity in 2007  and 2008 were 
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